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Although recent debates surrounding the relationship between commitments to gender 
equality and cultural justice have given a renewed impetus to feminist critiques of 
liberal conceptions of the public realm, prominent interventions by Martha Nussbaum 
and Monique Deveaux have continued to affirm one of two long-standing, yet 
controversial, feminist strategies for reconceptualising the public realm. While 
Nussbaum’s expansive notion of the public realm ultimately rests on a substantive 
conception of the good that cannot be readily reconciled with the aims of non-liberal 
feminist movements, Deveaux’s democracy approach struggles to define conditions 
for democratic participation that are substantive enough to safeguard the central goals 
of her feminist project and yet respect the diversity of women’s actual values and 
cultural attachments. These difficulties point towards the need for a more 
sophisticated understanding of the interaction between the capacity for agency in the 
wider social and personal sphere and effective citizenship in the public realm. 
Although a purely procedural account of democratic deliberation avoids the dangers 
of false universalism, it can only secure effective citizenship for women if some of the 
most serious structural inequalities that confront women are addressed. While such an 
approach falls well short of the demands associated with models such as Nussbaum’s 
expanded public realm, it none the less places significant limits on the scope of 
democratic deliberation.  
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Recent debates surrounding the relationship between a commitment to gender justice 
and demands for group rights for religious, ethnic and cultural minorities have given a 
renewed impetus to feminist critiques of liberal conceptions of the public realm. 
While questions of cultural justice have played a prominent role in liberal political 
theory for some considerable time, theorists have been slow to consider the impact of 
group rights upon gender equality. Indeed, some have explicitly invoked the notion of 
individual and group autonomy to argue that out of respect for cultural diversity the 
state should not intervene in the private sphere of family, religious and personal life.1 
From a feminist perspective such responses are deeply troubling. As feminist scholars 
have long argued, if women are to achieve equal citizenship, power relations in the 
private sphere must be subject to critical analysis and political intervention, and 
gender bias in the public sphere must be challenged (Arneil, 2007). At the same time 
there has been an increasing realisation among feminists that such a critique must be 
sensitive to women’s actual choices, values and cultural attachments. Although 
established cultural and religious practices are frequently at odds with a liberal 
conception of gender equality, many women strongly identify with the traditional way 
of life of their community.2  Indeed, rather than reject their cultural heritage, many 
indigenous feminist movements reside within their cultural traditions.  
 
Although feminists have been careful to acknowledge the impact of such cultural 
attachments for feminist critiques of the liberal public realm, recent interventions by 
Martha Nussbaum (1999) and Monique Deveaux (2006) have continued to affirm one 
of two long-standing, yet controversial, feminist strategies for reconceptualising the 
public realm. Although Nussbaum stresses that a feminist defence of gender equality 
should be grounded in a form of political liberalism that acknowledges a plurality of 
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comprehensive doctrines of the good, unlike Rawls, Nussbaum champions an 
expansive conception of the public realm, favouring wide-ranging intervention in the 
family and women’s position in society to promote gender equality. Nussbaum’s 
approach here echoes the well-established feminist strategy, championed most 
prominently by Susan Okin (1994), of extending liberal principles to what is 
traditionally perceived as the private sphere of family, marriage and sexuality. While 
advocates of this approach stress the significance for women of traditional liberal 
values such as autonomy, equality and individual liberty, they reject the narrow 
conception of the public realm and the sharp public/private distinction that 
characterise the liberal tradition, pointing to the impact unequal power relations in the 
private realm have upon women’s capacity for agency and effective citizenship.  
Thus, while Nussbaum acknowledges that respect for cultural and religious diversity 
entails the recognition of a private sphere free from state intervention, she argues that 
religious and cultural norms that threaten to undermine women’s basic human rights 
and their capacity to develop core human capabilities must be challenged.   Deveaux, 
in contrast, advocates a democracy approach that seeks to re-evaluate the distinction 
between public and private through the creation of new spaces for democratic activity 
that empower minority women and facilitate critical debate about established cultural 
norms and practices. On this account, successful democratic deliberation must engage 
with participants’ strategic interests and must respect their actual choices and 
preferences, even if these entail non-liberal outcomes. For Deveaux such democratic 
activity is not confined to formal political processes, but also entails acts of cultural 
dissent, subversion and reinvention in what has traditionally been regarded by liberal 
theorists as the private realm. This approach reflects the well-established concerns of 
feminists such as Iris Marion Young (1990) who have sought to promote a ‘politics of 
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difference’ that brings the values, experiences and voices of those traditionally 
confined to the private sphere into the realm of democratic politics. While advocates 
of the first strategy seek to expand the scope of liberal values, proponents of this 
approach argue that the exclusion of particularity from the public sphere associated 
with the liberal emphasis on formal equality and impartiality gives rise to a 
conception of citizenship that privileges dominant perspectives at the expenses of 
groups such as women who have been historically marginalised.3   
 
These two strategies have tended to reflect more general epistemological 
controversies within feminism concerning self, subject and subjectivity. While 
feminists attracted to the democratisation route have tended to emphasise the 
‘situated, specific, historically embodied condition of the female subject’ and the 
impact of ‘socio-cultural identities based on ethnicity, religion, sexuality, class and 
colour’ upon agents’ interests (Dietz 2003:409), advocates of the ‘expanded public 
realm’ strategy have defended the idea of a ‘generalisable, identifiable and 
collectively shared experience of womanhood’ (Okin 1994:4).  The paper argues that 
the ensuing fierce debate among feminists regarding the dangers of false universalism 
on the one hand and the fragmentation of the feminist project on the other, continues 
to cast a shadow over contemporary feminist critiques of dominant discourses 
regarding gender, culture and the public realm. Although Nussbaum aims to develop a 
difference sensitive feminism that avoids the dangers of false universalism, her 
expansive notion of the public realm ultimately rests on a substantive conception of 
the good that cannot be readily reconciled with the aims of non-liberal feminist 
movements. Yet, while Deveaux’s democracy approach promises to enable the 
diverse voices of women to be heard, Deveaux struggles to define conditions for 
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democratic participation that are substantive enough to safeguard the central goals of 
her feminist project and yet respect the diversity of women’s actual choices, values 
and cultural attachments.  These difficulties point to the need for a more sophisticated 
analysis of the complex interaction between the capacity for agency in the wider 
social and personal sphere and effective citizenship in the public realm. While a 
purely procedural account of democratic deliberation is well placed to ensure that 
cultural minorities are able to bring their values and norms to bear in the public realm, 
it can only secure effective citizenship for vulnerable group members such as women 
if some of the most serious structural inequalities in the wider social sphere, such as 
economic deprivation and lack of education, are addressed. While such an approach 
falls well short of the demands associated with models such as Nussbaum’s expansive 
public realm, it none the less places significant limits on the scope of democratic 
deliberation.  
 
Political Liberalism and the Expanded Public Sphere: Nussbaum’s Capabilities 
Approach 
In Sex and Social Justice Martha Nussbaum (1999b) explicitly seeks to redress the 
relationship between feminism and liberalism. While feminists have typically been 
critical of liberalism’s emphasis on individualism, formal equality and abstract reason, 
Nussbaum believes that properly conceived and consistently implemented, liberalism 
provides the basis for a robust defence of gender equality as a central human right. 
For Nussbaum, not only does the impartiality implied by a liberal notion of a common 
humanity offer a powerful challenge to often deeply entrenched discrimination against 
women, but the liberal emphasis on self-sufficiency as economic independence 
constitutes also an important goal for many women, who still lack sufficient resources 
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to care for themselves.  Furthermore, the primacy of the individual has much to offer 
to women, whose well-being is only too frequently sacrificed or subordinated to the 
interests of family or the wider community and who have  ‘too rarely been treated as 
ends in themselves, and too frequently treated as means to the ends of 
others’(Nussbaum 1999: 63). Finally, given the patriarchal nature of most societies, 
women have good grounds to distrust habit and tradition. After all ‘where the voice of 
tradition speaks, that voice is most often male’ (Nussbaum 1999b: 79). Thus, far from 
rejecting the liberal emphasis on reason, women have great need of this capacity. 
 
While for Nussbaum the core liberal values of personhood, autonomy, dignity and 
self-respect offer the most effective tools for securing equality for women world wide, 
she is nonetheless keenly aware of the difficulties that cultural diversity and demands 
for cultural justice pose for any liberal universalist project.  Many adherents to non-
liberal life-styles and conceptions of the good remain deeply committed to their way 
of life and continue to uphold traditions and customs, many of which cannot be easily 
reconciled with the norm of gender equality. This poses a complex dilemma. After all, 
it is difficult to see how one could be said to respect the bearers of such conceptions 
of the good, without at the same time respecting their choice to continue to uphold 
their traditional way of life.  In the face of these difficulties, Nussbaum argues that a 
feminist defence of gender equality should be grounded in a form of political 
liberalism which acknowledges the plurality of comprehensive doctrines of the good. 
Although political liberals insist that a ‘nonautonomous life should not be thrust upon 
someone by luck of birth’, they nonetheless respect that reasonable citizens may 
pursue such lives, ‘given a background of liberty and opportunity’ (Nussbaum 
1999a:110). While such an approach will require adherence to non-liberal 
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perspectives to acknowledge the equality of women as citizens, it does not demand 
that non-liberal perspectives endorse women’s equality as a comprehensive moral 
value. Thus, Nussbaum claims, her political liberalism rests upon a thin universalism 
that allows for reasonable pluralism. 
. 
Central to Nussbaum’s project is her capabilities approach, which seeks to identify 
activities characteristically performed by humans, which are so central that they are 
definitive of a life that is truly human. That is to say they are functions ‘without which 
(meaning without the availability of which) we would regard a life as not, or not fully, 
human’ (Nussbaum 1999b: 39). Here Nussbaum stresses that her approach does not 
aim to merely secure the necessities for bare survival, but seeks to identify the 
capacities required for full human functioning. In Sex and Social Justice she identifies 
the following central human functional capabilities: A normal life span, bodily health 
and physical integrity (clauses 1-3); emotional, affective, social and mental 
development (clauses   4, 5, 7 and 9); the ability to engage in critical reflection about 
the planning of one’s own life (clause 6); the ability to live with concern for and in 
relation to animals, plants and the environment (clause 8) and control over one’s own 
environment, both in terms of political participation and control over material goods 
(clause 10).4 While some of these central capabilities, such as political liberties, can 
be fully guaranteed by society, Nussbaum acknowledges that others, like good health, 
may involve an element of chance. These items on the list are therefore best viewed as 
political goals that provide a useful benchmark for aspirations and comparisons 
between the relative well-being of men and women.  
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According to Nussbaum, this list of central human capabilities is neither ahistorical 
nor a priori, but reflects ‘empirical findings of a broad and ongoing cross-cultural 
inquiry’ (Nussbaum 1999b: 40). Thus for Nussbaum these central capabilities are akin 
to Rawls’ primary goods. They are  
‘something that people from many different traditions, with many different 
fuller conceptions of the good, can agree on as the necessary basis for pursuing 
their good life. That is why the list is deliberately rather general.  Each of its 
components can be more concretely specified in accordance with one’s origin, 
religious beliefs, or tastes. In that sense, the consensus that it hopes to evoke has 
many of the features of the overlapping consensus described by Rawls’. 
(Nussbaum 1999b:40) 
  
However Nussbaum’s approach differs from Rawls’ political liberalism in at least two 
important respects. Whereas Rawls develops his political liberalism within the context 
of modern liberal societies, Nussbaum regards her list of capabilities as universally 
applicable. Furthermore, while Rawls’ political liberalism only applies to the basic 
structure of society in the political sphere, Nussbaum favours ‘wide-ranging 
intervention by the state and other bodies to change the family and women’s place in 
society and in turn the comprehensive doctrines that underpin family structures’ 
(Enslin 2003:83). Thus, while Nussbaum recognises that respect for cultural and 
religious diversity entails the recognition of a private sphere free from state 
intervention, her conception of political liberalism rests on a much more expansive 
conception of the public realm than that advocated by writers such as Rawls. For 
Nussbaum, if liberalism is to fulfil its promise to secure for women autonomy, 
dignity, and self-respect, norms governing family, religious or cultural life that 
threaten to undermine women’s basic human rights and their capacity to develop core 
human capabilities must be challenged.5  
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Yet, while the liberal emphasis on impartiality and formal equality undoubtedly has 
provided women with an important weapon in their struggle for political inclusion 
(Phillips, 1993), the strategy of extending these values to aspects of family, religious 
and cultural life has given cause for considerable disquiet among feminists. Most 
notably it has given rise to the worry that such an approach rests on a false 
universalism that unduly privileges liberal values and fails to pay sufficient attention 
to women’s actual choices, values and commitments.6 Although Nussbaum claims her 
thin universalism is attentive to the claims of difference and diversity and thus avoids 
these long-standing concerns, the difficulties associated with her expanded conception 
of the public realm raise doubts about whether she succeeds in her aims. Nussbaum’s 
discussion of freedom of religion provides a good illustration of the problems she 
faces in this regard. For Nussbaum the ability to search for the good in a religious way 
constitutes one of the liberties most deserving of protection. Thus, although all 
citizens must acknowledge women’s equality in the public realm, as a political liberal 
Nussbaum acknowledges that respect for citizens’ different comprehensive 
conceptions of the good sets limits to the degree to which the state can legitimately 
intervene in religious and cultural practices. Hence, where laws designed to ensure 
non-discrimination on the grounds of gender impact upon the very core of religious 
practices and thus place a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion, the 
protection of religious liberty may at times provide a compelling ground for an 
exemption, ‘as long as the law in question is narrowly tailored to protect that interest’ 
(Nussbaum 1999b:111). Thus, religious groups may, for instance, be granted an 
exemption from sex discrimination law in the appointment of priests. However, ‘no 
system of religious laws should be permitted to interfere with the basic human rights 
of citizens’ (Nussbaum 1999b:103). Consequently, with regard to matters that fall 
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within the public sphere, which on Nussbaum’s account includes the family, the 
upbringing of children, and the status of women in society in general, the state has 
good reasons to intervene in religious practices that violate the norm of gender 
equality. Thus, for example, the state should not uphold any religious, personal or 
family laws that discriminate against women. Furthermore, a religious leader who 
employs speech in the public realm to deny women’s equal humanity, be it to justify 
marital rape or to attack contraception, ‘should be strongly criticised as a subverter of 
the constitution’ (Nussbaum 1999b:114). Finally, while parents may have a legitimate 
interest in raising their children within their religion, the state must ensure that all 
children are able fully to develop their capabilities. Therefore girls must be given an 
equal education that equips them for employment and citizenship and be made aware 
of the public commitment to the norm of gender equality. 
 
As these examples suggest, on Nussbaum’s expansive reading of the public sphere, 
the demand to respect women’s equality as citizens will place considerable burdens 
on non-liberal perspectives. For instance, while Islamic law is rooted in a patriarchal 
view of society and advocates different rights for men and women, for many Muslims 
adherence to Islamic personal and family law is a ‘quintessential sign of loyalty to 
Islam and thus for many Islamic groups constitutes the core of Islamic identity’ 
(Loenen 2002:426). Yet, such an understanding of what comprises the core of a 
religious identity cannot be readily reconciled with Nussbaum’s expansive view of the 
public sphere. After all on Nussbaum’s account personal and family law fall within 
the public realm and thus cannot be exempt from the norm of gender equality. 
Similarly, Nussbaum’s view of what should be viewed as an attack upon women’s 
constitutional right to equality does not sit easily with the commitment of the Catholic 
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Church to publicly oppose and criticise contraception. Indeed on Nussbaum’s account 
anyone who publicly endorsed the view that life begins at conception would have to 
be classed a ‘subverter of the constitution’. As these examples indicate, ultimately 
Nussbaum’s expansive account of the public realm entails quite a substantive 
conception of the good. Such a thick conception of the good cannot be readily 
reconciled with her claim to advance a form of thin universalism. 
 
More troubling still from a feminist perspective, the thick conception of the good that 
underpins Nussbaum’s conception of an expanded public sphere is not well suited to 
support the aims and aspirations of many non-liberal feminist movements. While 
Nussbaum (1999b:66) quite rightly points to many examples of women around the 
world who are ‘using the language of liberalism’ in their struggle for gender equality, 
at least some feminist movements do not endorse the liberal conception of gender 
equality, but instead situate their demands for equality within the context of their 
traditional culture, religion or class. Thus, for example, the feminism of many Muslim 
feminists is firmly rooted in Islam, giving rise to a fight for liberation in a religious 
context.  Rather than reject the legitimacy of traditional Islamic personal and family 
law, these feminists have thought to re-interpret existing law to promote greater 
equality via an appeal to alternative readings of the Qur’an or by pointing to 
inconsistencies in current practices (Eissa 1999; Moosa 1995; Fazaeli 2007). In this 
context Muslim feminists typically stress that the aim of such a reassessment is to 
offer a more authentic interpretation of the Islamic tradition.  
 
Although Nussbaum (1999b: 70/71) believes that such anti-liberal feminists are 
unwise to ‘jettison the liberal account of human essence in favour of an account that 
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gives more centrality to “accidental” features such as religion or class or even 
gender’, she stresses that her type of political liberalism ‘strives to leave space for 
these other identities’. Yet, given the rather substantive nature of Nussbaum’s liberal 
universalism, her claim to be able to accommodate a wide variety of non-liberal 
feminisms is at best problematic. For example, Nussbaum’s view of what respect for 
women’s equality as citizens entails cannot be easily reconciled with the conception 
of the political realm and its relationship to Islam inherent in the position of Muslim 
feminists committed to Islamic personal and family law.  Furthermore, the emphasis 
upon individual autonomy and critical reason in clause 6 of Nussbaum’s list of core 
human capabilities will leave many feminists who have consistently attacked this 
typically liberal conception of identity with a considerable sense of unease.7 While 
these tensions between diverse feminisms arguably constitute a real dilemma for any 
feminist who seeks to ground a defence of gender equality in a liberal paradigm, it is a 
problem that Nussbaum does not address. Indeed, although Nussbaum (1999b:9) 
claims that her approach ‘lets the voices of many women speak’, one of the most 
striking features of Sex and Social Justice is its failure to systematically engage with 
the work of non-liberal feminists, whose conceptions of gender equality challenge her 
liberal feminist paradigm.8  From a feminist perspective this oversight is rather telling. 
While feminism has been sensitive to the dangers of uncritically endorsing cultural 
norms, it has also been keenly aware of the perils of presenting culture specific norms 
as universal principles. Indeed, historically much of the feminist critique of liberalism 
has been fuelled by worries regarding misleading universalist claims. In her quest to 
develop a universal defence of gender equality, Nussbaum underestimates the extent 
to which views of what constitutes gender equality are shaped by cultural factors and 
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thus fails to allay long-standing feminist concerns surrounding attempts to promote 
gender equality by expanding the scope of the liberal public realm.  
 
Diversity within the Public Realm: Deveaux’s Democratisation Approach 
In the light of the difficulties that surround Nussbaum’s strategy, feminists may well 
be attracted to approaches, such as Deveaux’s (2006) attempt to re-evaluate the 
distinction between public and private through the creation of new spaces for 
democratic activity that empower minority women and facilitate critical debate about 
established cultural norms and practices. In contrast to Nussbaum’s normative 
approach, which characterises tensions between gender equality and cultural justice as 
first and foremost a clash of values, Deveaux argues that such disputes most often 
reflect disruptions in social power relations and hierarchies and are thus best analysed 
in term of power and democratic practice. Indeed tensions between liberal norms and 
many of the cultural practices that have given rise to concern among feminists expose 
not just intercultural disputes, but often also highlight intracultural disagreements over 
the interpretation, meaning and legitimacy of particular norms. Such conflicts are 
often strategic or political in character reflecting interests and power relations both 
within the community and between the community and the wider society. For 
example, in recent years there has been considerable debate within Jewish and 
Muslim communities regarding the origin, nature and interpretation of the 
communities’ personal and family law.9   
 
Deveaux argues that conflicts about cultural practices that are at odds with the norm 
of gender equality are best addressed through deliberative forums that bring together a 
cross section of the community, including community leaders, representatives from 
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women’s groups, representatives from groups with special expertise, such as legal 
reform groups, and government policy makers. Her model of democratic deliberation 
here is explicitly political and conceives of deliberation not as moral argumentation 
aimed at normative consensus, but as engaged with citizens’ strategic interests and 
needs, and focused on practical concerns and concrete consequences. In stark contrast 
to Nussbaum’s tendency to condemn those who publicly challenge women’s equal 
humanity as ‘subverters of the constitution’, Deveaux (2006:220) explicitly rejects the 
notion that the interests of vulnerable group members such as women are best 
protected by preventing ‘the introduction of normatively unreasonable or unjust 
claims in political dialogue’. Such an approach merely encourages participants to 
present strategic interests as moral arguments, and interest based concerns as issues of 
cultural identity. Not only do such moves make disputes appear more intractable, they 
often also camouflage power relations ‘with the result that some individuals are left 
more vulnerable or powerless’ (Deveaux, 2007: 101).  Rather than exclude strategic 
interests, deliberation should encourage participants to give ‘frank and concrete 
reasons in support of particular customs and proposals for or against change’ 
(Deveaux 2005:349). According to Deveaux, the ensuing negotiations, bargaining and 
compromises encourage critical reflection upon the validity of the participants’ 
interests. In this context ‘those that simply seek to maintain control over vulnerable 
members of their community … will be hard pressed to disguise their motive or find a 
legitimate justification for it that cannot be revealed as cynical window-dressing’ 
(Deveaux 2005:350).   
 
To ensure that such political deliberation does not simply shore up the advantages of 
the powerful a number of conditions must be met. Firstly, deliberation about contested 
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cultural practices should ‘take place against the background of a liberal democratic 
state that protects fundamental individual rights and freedoms’, and which secures the 
‘moral minimum’ by prohibiting customs that cause serious physical harm and require 
outright coercion (Deveaux, 2006:94). Furthermore, in addition to the norm of 
democratic legitimacy, which demands that all affected by decisions should be 
consulted, political deliberation should be bound by three further principles: non-
domination, political equality and revisability.  While the principle of non-domination 
aims to ensure that traditionally marginalised group members cannot be silenced 
though pressure tactics or overt oppression, the principle of political equality seeks to 
guarantee ‘the presence of real opportunities for all citizens to participate in debate 
and decision-making’ (Deveaux 2005:350). This not only requires that such 
opportunities are in principle available, but also entails trying to prevent 
‘“extrapolitical and endogenous forms of influence, such as power, wealth and pre-
existing social inequalities” from impacting deliberation and its outcome’ (Deveaux 
2005:350).  Finally, the principle of revisability stipulates that it should always be 
possible to revisit decisions at a later date. This implies that outcomes of deliberation 
are only just if they do not undermine the ‘future ability of citizens to deliberate on 
these or other issues if and when they are revisited’ (Deveaux 2006: 116/7). 
Applying the principle of political equality to cultural conflicts clearly poses a 
complex and difficult challenge, given that who counts as a group member is at times 
contested and that ‘who can participate in political life is, for many culturally 
determined’ (Deveaux 2005:351). The latter difficulty can pose a particular obstacle 
to the inclusion of marginalised group members such as women. While Deveaux 
(2005:351) acknowledges these difficulties, she argues that such problems can be 
addressed, at least in part, ‘though the deliberate expansion of informal sites of social 
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and political debate and contestation’. For Deveaux such informal democratic activity 
extends not just to civil society, but includes social practices and responses to social 
norms and restrictions. Individual members of groups can and do challenge 
discriminatory rules or practices within their cultures by protesting to group leaders, 
‘seeking legal and political support outside of the collective’, or by employing 
informal acts of resistance aimed at reshaping social norms and customs (Deveaux 
2006:16). Such informal democratic activity  ‘can speak volumes about the legitimacy 
or illegitimacy of roles and customs’ and thus needs to be taken into account in 
assessing the validity of social and cultural practices (Deveaux 2006:118). 
As a concrete example of how deliberative processes can give rise to reforms that 
promote greater gender equality, while respecting traditional non-liberal values and 
commitments, Deveaux points to the negotiations in the 1990s leading up to the 
reform of customary marriages in South Africa. Under established customary law as 
practiced by most blacks in South Africa, women were denied the right to inherit land, 
enter into contracts, initiate their own divorces, or retain equal custody rights vis-à-vis 
children in the case of divorce. Since such practices could not be readily reconciled 
with the equality clause in the Bill of Rights enshrined in the South African 
constitution, the South African Law Commission set up in 1998 a series of 
consultations that brought together a cross section of the community, including 
representatives from legal reform groups and women’s associations, Chiefs from the 
Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) and scholars of 
constitutional and customary law. Despite initial opposition by tribal chiefs, the 
negotiations provided the basis for considerable reform of traditional customary law, 
giving rise to the recognition of women’s contractual and property rights, securing for 
women equal guardianship and custody rights in relation to children, and placing 
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divorce and custody matters in the hands of family courts.  However, the consultation 
process also highlighted widespread support for the retention of lobolo or bride-
wealth (although no longer required for the validity of a marriage) and endorsed the 
continued recognition of polygyny in order to provide legal protection for the interests 
of women in polygynous marriages. 
At first glance Deveaux’s emphasis on negotiation and debate, and her preoccupation 
with practical concerns and consequences, appear to make her approach well suited to 
the aspirations of indigenous feminist movements such as Muslim and Jewish 
feminists, who have sought to promote greater gender equality through the 
reinterpretation of the existing legal traditions surrounding Jewish and Muslim family 
law. For these feminists the promise of formal and informal democratic forums that 
will facilitate critical debate and enable reassessments is clearly attractive. However, 
ultimately, Deveaux’s model remains problematic on at least two counts: (a) Not only 
is her discussion of the conditions for democratic participation ambiguous, (b) her 
account of the conditions for agency is not sufficiently robust to ensure that all 
women acquire the capacities essential for democratic citizenship.  
While Deveaux stresses the pragmatic, issue-based nature of her approach, her 
formulation of the conditions for democratic deliberation is arguably much more 
substantive and demanding than the South African example would suggest. In her 
critique of Deveaux, Okin (2005), for example, questions whether the South African 
marriages case does indeed meet Deveaux’s criteria for non-domination and political 
equality. As Okin notes, the participation of non-elected tribal leaders does not sit 
well with Deveaux’s argument that in order to guarantee political equality extra-
political forms of influence such as power, wealth and pre-existing social inequalities 
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should not be allowed to influence deliberations and outcomes. Furthermore, the 
resistance by at least some tribal leaders to the very idea that women should play a 
greater part in decision-making in South African society ‘must affect the power 
dynamic of the process, especially between the women (whom such leaders could 
hardly have regarded as their political equals) and the leaders (whom quite probably 
some of the women saw as ‘more than equals’) (Okin 2005:83). As Okin’s concerns 
highlight, in their current formulation Deveaux’s criteria for democratic participation 
may well have more far reaching implications then she acknowledges. Not only may 
the principle of equality entail much more careful attention to who is to act as a 
representative and how representatives are chosen, but the principle of non-
domination may well require precisely the kind of wide-ranging intervention in the 
family and women’s position in society in general favoured by Nussbaum. While 
critics like Okin may welcome such extensive intervention, it cannot be readily 
reconciled with Deveaux’s aim to offer a procedural account of democratic 
deliberation that respects the values of participants and engages with their strategic 
interests. Indeed, it is doubtful whether such a substantive reading would gain the 
support of traditional cultural and religious minorities.  While the rules of democratic 
deliberation and decision-making undoubtedly impose burdens upon traditional 
cultural and religious communities, Deveaux (2006:222) stresses that her procedural 
account would none the less be attractive to such minorities, since it would enable 
them to maintain ‘a degree of self-determination as regards cultural reform’ and thus 
may constitute ‘the best available option’.10 Yet, if the conditions of democratic 
participation themselves already entail significant revisions to the very substance of 
traditions, practices and norms, it is difficult to see why powerful members of 
communities should be motivated to participate in such processes. Indeed, according 
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to Deveaux (2006:219) her procedural account of democratic deliberation implies that 
‘group members may justly reject the imposition of an a priori norm of equality on the 
terms and outcomes of political debate’. Yet, on a substantive reading of the 
conditions of democratic participation it is hard to envisage that the process would 
generate anything other than predominately liberal outcomes. 
In the light of these difficulties Deveaux may well wish to adopt a more minimal 
reading of the conditions for democratic participation. Her endorsement of the South 
African case points to a reading of the conditions for democratic participation that 
emphasises participation and voice and the prevention of overt coercion, but that 
would not seek to eliminate all extrapolitical and endogenous forms of influence.  
After all, to insist on eliminating the influence of all extrapolitical factors such as 
power, wealth and pre-existing social inequalities, risks prescribing an over-idealised 
and ultimately overly demanding conception of political deliberation, that threatens to 
impose upon cultural and religious communities conditions that are rarely, if ever, met 
in democratic deliberations within liberal societies. Yet, while a minimal reading fits 
well with the notion of a procedural account of democratic deliberation, it offers 
notably less protection to vulnerable group members such as women.  If extrapolitical 
and endogenous forms of influence cannot be eliminated from formal democratic 
deliberations, traditionally marginalised group members will need to be confident and 
robust in defence of their own interests. The extent to which women can successfully 
protect their interests under such conditions will to a considerable degree depend upon 
the wider background conditions that shape women’s agency and the success or 
otherwise of informal sites of political debate and contestation that, on Deveaux’s 
model, support the formal deliberative processes.  
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While Deveaux is keenly aware that the development of deliberative procedures that 
do not simply re-inscribe existing power relations requires careful attention to the 
wider social and political context, she rejects the liberal emphasis upon autonomy as a 
key criterion for individual agency. For Deveaux (2007:145) an ‘emphasis on self-
determination or capacities for self-definition or authenticity’ obscures the benefits 
individuals may derive from complying with established norms and practices and 
‘disposes the liberal state towards regulating or even censuring too wide a range of 
social customs’.  For Deveaux  (2007:151) customs such as arranged marriage are 
best conceived not as options that otherwise autonomous individuals choose among a 
range of alternatives, but as frameworks ‘for achieving other things of value, namely 
marriage, children, tradition, and family and social acceptance’. In the light of this, 
Deveaux (2007:151) proposes an account of agency that rather than  ‘insist that 
central aspects of one’s identity must be submitted to significant critical scrutiny’, 
focuses on ‘the range of actual and possible individual responses to specific customs 
and arrangements’ and on ‘subtler expressions of reflection and action, such as 
subverting a cultural tradition from the inside’. On this account agency constitutes 
‘any activity or expression that signals a response to a prevailing social norm, custom, 
role or arrangement’ which reflects or helps to ‘secure something that the person has 
cause to value’ (Deveaux 2007:153/157).  In this context Deveaux (2006: 124) 
repeatedly emphasises the indirect ways in which women in traditional communities 
tend to exercise agency through small decisions such as acts of social transgression, 
subversion or indirect resistance, like, for example, the temporarily abdication of 
‘domestic and caretaking duties’. 
Although recognition of the benefits that women may derive from traditional customs 
and practices and the subtle ways in which they may modify and subvert these offers 
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important insights into the factors that shape the lives of women in traditional 
communities, from a feminist perspective her account of agency is none the less 
troubling. As Deveaux’s comparison between women’s indirect strategies and the 
tools employed by peasants against their masters suggests, transgression, subversion 
and indirect resistance are typically the tactics of the powerless and tend only to have 
a limited impact. While it may well be true that ‘much of what individuals in general 
want in life comes in … “mixed bundles”, that require resignation to certain tradeoffs 
as a means to secure goods one values’ (Narayan 2002:422), some bundles are more 
attractive than others. Although indirect resistance, transgression and subversion may 
well enable women to transform some aspects of women’s traditional social roles, 
they are unlikely to alter the overarching power relations within the community. The 
limited range of life options in traditional cultures is liable to leave women with little 
room, short of outright exit, to negotiate the overall shape of the ‘mixed bundles’ that 
constitute their social role.  In this context Deveaux is too quick to dismiss the 
dangers of adaptive preferences. According to Deveaux (2006:93)’ in liberal 
democracies worries about adaptive preferences have less purchase, since ‘the 
majority culture offers a range of life options for women, and few groups are so 
isolated that their members cannot imagine other possible lives’. This, however, not 
only underestimates the costs of exit facing women dissatisfied with their traditional 
roles, it also assumes that such women will have the confidence and skills to avail 
themselves of the options offered by mainstream society. At the very least this would 
require an education system that ensures that all children are taught a broad range of 
skills and that fosters cross-cultural contact. Yet, Deveaux is critical of liberal 
conceptions of autonomy that entail the rejection of religious schooling that reinforces 
traditional sexual roles.11  Taken together these worries raise real doubts about 
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whether the informal democratic activities and general background conditions 
envisaged by Deveaux will be sufficient to ensure that women will be able to 
participate on equal terms in formal democratic deliberation governed by a more 
minimal reading of her conditions for democratic participation.  Ultimately Deveaux 
does not resolve the tensions between her desire to provide a purely procedural 
account of democratic deliberation that respects participants’ actual choices, values 
and cultural attachments, and her commitment to empowering women to challenge 
established power relations within both the formal political realm and the wider social 
and cultural sphere. While her formal definition of the conditions for democratic 
participation is so demanding that it is difficult to envisage that such deliberation 
could generate anything other than overwhelmingly liberal outcomes, her 
endorsement of the South Africa case together with her account of agency point to a 
reading of the conditions for democratic participation that is so minimal it risks 
undermining the central goals of her feminist project.  
 
Democracy and Agency 
The difficulties inherent in Deveaux’s response suggest that feminists attracted to the 
democratisation strategy as a way of reconceptualising the public sphere will need to 
be more aware of the complex interaction between the capacity for agency in the 
wider social and personal sphere and the conditions for effective citizenship in the 
public realm. Ironically, in this effort feminists may benefit from drawing on the 
recent work of liberal writers such as Habermas. As Habermas (1996) notes, while 
citizens will only be able to safeguard the life context within which individuals have 
formulated their identity if they are able to participate in the formulation of the rights 
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and norms that govern their life, effective citizenship also requires the protection of 
individual rights and liberties to ensure that all citizens enjoy a sufficient degree of 
independence. While Habermas’ own model remains too firmly wedded to liberal 
preoccupations with individual autonomy and impartiality to respond directly to 
feminist concerns, his work points towards a reconceptualisation of the scope of the 
public realm and its relationship to the private which neither privileges agency nor 
participation.12 While a purely procedural account of democratic participation is well 
placed to ensure that cultural minorities are able to bring their values and norms to 
bear in public deliberation, it can only secure effective citizenship for vulnerable 
group members such as women if their capacity for agency in the wider social and 
personal sphere is properly safeguarded. Although Deveaux is correct to highlight the 
dangers of conceiving of agency in terms of liberal values such as personal autonomy, 
the difficulties inherent in her conception of agency point to the need for a more 
robust account that not only safeguards women’s basic rights and civil liberties, but 
also addresses some of the most serious structural inequalities that confront women.  
In this regard writers such as Nussbaum (1999b) quite rightly point to factors such as 
economic independence and education as important goals for women. While Deveaux 
(2006) acknowledges that a commitment to equal political participation may well 
require state intervention to address structural inequalities such as economic 
deprivation and lack of education, she fails to recognise the implications of such 
intervention for the scope of democratic deliberation.  For example, a commitment to 
secure for women a minimal level of economic well-being may well imply that rules 
regarding inheritance and divorce cannot simply be left to minority groups to 
negotiate in the process of democratic deliberation. While a liberal state committed to 
equal citizenship may be able to permit a degree of diversity in this regard, it must set 
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a clear framework for minimal provisions. Similarly a regard for women’s agency 
will set real limits to negotiations regarding educational provisions. As noted earlier, 
if women are to enjoy a realistic right of exit the state has to ensure that they are able 
to acquire in the course of their education a broad range of skills that extend beyond 
those required for traditional gender roles.  As these examples indicate, even a modest 
commitment to minimise the most glaring structural inequalities would set significant 
limits to the type of issues that could be settled by democratic deliberation alone.  
Given that debates about gender equality and cultural justice typically arise when 
minorities seek specific exemptions from majority provisions or want community 
based norms recognised in particular spheres, the nature and content of a framework 
of minimal provisions that delimit the scope of democratic deliberation is best 
established on an issue by issue basis. While fundamental individual rights and 
liberties provide a reference point for determining what constitutes an acceptable 
minimal standard in such instances, the interpretation and application of these rights 
varies across liberal polities and liberal democracies will need to draw on the norms 
of distributive justice and equality provisions that prevail in their particular polity.13 
Consequently, the precise content of minimal provisions is liable to vary in 
accordance with the wider political context within which specific debates take place. 
While such a minimal framework would secure for women a degree of independence, 
it does, of course, fall well short of the rather demanding conditions for democratic 
participation implicit in Okin’s substantive reading of Deveaux or Nussbaum’s 
expansive public sphere. A framework of baseline provisions limits rather than 
eliminates extrapolitical influences and leaves considerable scope for disagreements 
regarding the role of women in society.  While a framework designed to alleviate 
gross structural inequalities sets limits to the scope of democratic deliberation, within 
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these limits such an approach is compatible with a purely procedural account of 
democratic deliberation. Indeed, within a framework that secures a degree of 
economic independence for women, informal debate and indirect resistance, 
transgression and subversion may well be sufficient to ensure that women can protect 
their interests in formal political deliberations governed by a minimal reading of the 
conditions for democratic participation.  
Conclusion 
While the problems regarding false universalism that continue to beset strategies such 
as Nussbaum’s expansive conception of the public realm may well lead feminists to 
favour the democratisation approach to the reconceptualisation of the liberal public 
realm, the problems inherent in Deveaux’s account highlight the need for a robust 
account of agency that secures for women the independence essential for effective 
participation in both formal and informal democratic deliberation. Yet the pre-
occupation with self-determination, capacities for self-definition, or authenticity that 
has characterised recent feminist discourses regarding agency obscures many of the 
factors that shape the lives of women in tradition communities.  Rather than home in 
on such distinctly liberal values, feminists may be best advised to focus on structural 
inequalities such as economic deprivation and lack of education. While such an 
approach sets clear limits to the scope of democratic deliberation, it avoids the 
difficulties associated with both Nussbaum’s expansive conception of the public 
realm and a substantive reading of Deveaux’s conditions for democratic participation. 
Indeed a framework of baseline provisions designed to secure a degree of economic 
independence for women may well be sufficient to ensure that women can protect 
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their interests in formal political deliberations governed by a minimal reading of the 
conditions for democratic participation.  
                                                 
Endnotes 
 
1 For a critique of this approach see Mackenzie, 2007. 
2 For instance, while practices such as veiling may represent a symbol of female subservience, some 
Muslim women have argued that veiling can constitute an empowering practice creating a space for 
women within the public domain free from the pressures of sexuality, whereas others have come to 
regard it as an important symbol in their struggle against anti-colonialism. For a more detailed 
discussion see Honig 1999 and Carens 2000. Similarly, in South Africa studies of attitudes towards 
lobola , or bride price, suggest that even among women there is considerable support for the practice 
based on the perception that it ‘has positive effects for women, making them feel valued and respected’ 
(C. Walker 1992: 58). Even when women are critical of established cultural practices, their responses 
are often complex and multifaceted. While the women of the Sufi Pirzada community in Narayan’s 
(2002) study were critical of purda and veiling, they none the less recognised that these practices bring 
with them certain benefits that they have good reason to value.  
3 Not only were women historically identified with the private sphere of the particular and the affective 
and thus seen as lacking in the qualities required for public life, if particularity is assigned to the non-
political private sphere then once women enter the ‘male’ public sphere the way in which they differ 
from men is seen as deviating from the norm. Thus equality becomes defined in terms of the removal 
of women’s disadvantage or disability, with disadvantage being determined by a model that is 
intrinsically male (Mendus, 1992). 
4 For a full account of Nussbaum’s central human functional capabilities see Sex and Social Justice pp 
41-42. In this abbreviated account I have drawn upon Charleswoth’s (2000) summary of Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach..  
5 For Nussbaum this includes all the core capabilities identified in Sex and Social Justice as essential 
for full human functioning. 
6 For an overview of these debates see for example Dietz (2003). 
7 See for example C. Pateman, (1988) and C. Gilligan (1995).   
8 As Norton (2001) notes, while Nussbaum relates the stories of typically poor and uneducated women 
in a manner and context that support her own contentions, she does not acknowledge the work of the 
many women scholars in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East who write on sex and social justice. 
9  For a detailed discussion of these cases see A. Shachar (2001).. 
10 Deveaux (2006:223) acknowledges that the conditions for democratic participation may be 
particularly burdensome for religious communities, ‘since nondemocratic forms of decision-making 
and authority are often constitutive of their identity’. However, she (2006:223) insists that even in these 
cases the liberal state should encourage the development of democratic means of settling disputes and 
should ‘support internal group processes for the re-evaluation and reform of contested customs and 
arrangements, particularly for women’. 
11 In this context Deveaux explicitly rejects Marilyn Friedman’s  (2003) account of procedural 
autonomy, which insists that women must early in life develop the capacity to reflect upon situations 
and make decisions. 
12 I addressed the difficulties that surround Habermas’ continued pre-occupation with autonomy and 
impartiality in a previous paper (see Baumeister 2003). 
13 At some level these norms and standards, of course, also reflect democratic processes, in so far as the 
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